According to recent work in the new field of lexical pragmatics, the meanings of words are frequently pragmatically adjusted and fine-tuned in context, so that their contribution to the proposition expressed is different from their lexically encoded sense. Well-known examples include lexical narrowing (e.g. 'drink' used to mean ALCOHOLIC DRINK), approximation (or loosening) (e.g. 'flat' used to mean RELATIVELY FLAT) and metaphorical extension (e.g. 'bulldozer' used to mean FORCEFUL PERSON). These three phenomena are often studied in isolation from each other and given quite distinct kinds of explanation. In this chapter, we will propose a more unified account. We will try to show that narrowing, loosening and metaphorical extension are simply different outcomes of a single interpretive process which creates an ad hoc concept, or occasion-specific sense, based on interaction among encoded concepts, contextual information and pragmatic expectations or principles.
Introduction
The relatively new field of lexical pragmatics explores the application of the semanticspragmatics distinction at the level of individual words or phrases rather than whole sentences.
The advantages of distinguishing semantic and pragmatic aspects of word meaning have long been recognised in pragmatically-oriented approaches to the philosophy of language, and were the starting point for Grice's William James Lectures (Grice 1967/89: 3-21) . However, the development of a separate field of lexical pragmatics was accelerated in the 1990s by a series of publications by linguists, psychologists and philosophers proposing more or less substantial departures from Grice's account.
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The approaches discussed in this chapter share the view that lexical interpretation typically involves the construction of an ad hoc concept or occasion-specific sense, based on interaction among encoded concepts, contextual information and pragmatic expectations or principles. Use of the term 'ad hoc concept' in this connection is often traced to the psychologist Lawrence Barsalou (1987 Barsalou ( , 1993 , whose work on categorisation showed that prototypical narrowing (i.e. the interpretation of a general term as picking out a subset of prototypical or stereotypical category members) was much more flexible and contextdependent than was standardly assumed. In later work (e.g. by the psycholinguist Sam
Glucksberg and his colleagues, and by pragmatists working within the relevance-theoretic framework), it was suggested that the outcome of the ad hoc concept construction process could be either a narrowing or a broadening of the linguistically-specified meaning: that is, the communicated concept may be either more specific or more general than the encoded concept. This opens up the possibility of a unified account on which lexical narrowing and broadening (or a combination of the two) are the outcomes of a single interpretive process which fine-tunes the interpretation of almost every word. We will follow the standard practice of representing ad hoc concepts as starred concepts (e.g. HAPPY*, SHARK*, BREAK*).
The most radical versions of this unified approach argue not only that narrowing and broadening involve the same interpretive mechanisms and may combine in the interpretation of a single word, but that there is a continuum of cases of broadening, ranging from strictly literal use through approximation and other forms of loosening to 'figurative' cases such as hyperbole and metaphor, with no clear cut-off points between them. Such fully unified accounts reject the traditional distinction between literal and figurative meaning and claim that approximation, hyperbole and metaphor are not distinct natural kinds, requiring different interpretive mechanisms, but involve exactly the same interpretive processes as are used for ordinary, literal utterances. This is a substantial departure from the standard Gricean account.
2
Whether or not they aim to provide a unified account of the full range of cases, most current approaches to lexical pragmatics also share the view that narrowing and/or broadening contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances (what is asserted or explicated) as well as to what is implicated. That is, the ad hoc concepts created by the pragmatic interpretation of individual words and phrases are seen as constituents of the proposition the speaker is taken to have expressed, rather than merely contributing to 4 implicatures, as in the standard Gricean account. Following Recanati (1993) , we will call such approaches truth-conditional pragmatic approaches. 3, 4 Although there is a growing consensus that lexical interpretation involves the construction of ad hoc concepts which contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances, there is much less agreement on the nature of the interpretive mechanisms involved.
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In this chapter, we will propose a radical version of the unified truth-conditional pragmatic account, using the framework of relevance theory, and compare it with some alternative accounts. The focus will be not so much on justifying the relevance-theoretic approach as compared to alternative pragmatic approaches, but on raising a more general question about the nature of the cognitive processes involved. We will argue (in line with Sperber & Wilson, forthcoming; Wilson & Carston, 2006 ) that lexical narrowing and 3 For many philosophers of language, the term 'truth-conditional pragmatics' is closely associated with the position known as 'contextualist semantics', aspects of which we do not necessarily endorse. However, for ease of exposition, we continue to use the label in this paper, since it provides a clear way of distinguishing the kind of account we advocate from those that relegate all but the bare minimum of pragmatically contributed meaning to the secondary level of conversational implicature. 4 A fully unified truth-conditional account in which metaphor and hyperbole are seen as contributing to the proposition asserted or explicated has to allow for a much greater degree of indeterminacy at the level of truthconditional content than is envisaged on standard Gricean accounts. 5 There are also widely differing views on the nature of lexical meaning, concepts and ad hoc concepts. We hold the broadly Fodorian view that the mentally-represented concepts encoded by lexical items are atomic (unstructured), coupled with the assumption that atomic concepts provide access to various kinds of mentally represented information, in particular encyclopaedic information about the entities that fall in their denotation.
For discussion, see Sperber (1996) , Sperber & Wilson (1998 ), Carston (2002 , and Horsey (2006). broadening are genuinely inferential processes, and that an inferential account of lexical pragmatics is preferable to non-inferential accounts.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces and illustrates the basic data that a theory of lexical pragmatics should explain. Section 3 argues that the data call for a radical version of the unified truth-conditional pragmatic account, and that ad hoc concept construction is the unitary process required. In that section, we contrast fully inferential with partly inferential and purely associative accounts of the cognitive mechanisms involved in lexical interpretation, and in section 4, we propose an inferential account of lexical narrowing and broadening using the framework of relevance theory. Section 5 raises some further issues and considers some possible objections to a unified inferential approach.
Varieties of lexical adjustment
The aim of this section is to illustrate the processes of lexical narrowing and lexical broadening, using a variety of examples which suggest that there is a continuum of cases between literal use, approximation, metaphor and hyperbole, with no clear divisions between them. We will try to show that narrowing and broadening are flexible, highly contextdependent processes which cannot be adequately handled in terms of code-like rules, and end by introducing a further range of data that a unified account of lexical pragmatics might help to explain.
Lexical narrowing involves the use of a word to convey a more specific sense than the encoded one, with a more restricted denotation (picking out a subset of the items that fall under the encoded concept). Narrowing may take place to different degrees, and in different directions. Some illustrations are given in (1): 6 1a. I'm not drinking tonight.
1b. Buying a house is easy if you've got money.
1c.
Churchill was a man.
In various different circumstances, the speaker of (1a) might be understood as conveying that she will not drink any liquid at all, that she will not drink any alcohol (or any of a certain type of alcohol, e.g. spirits), or that she will not drink significant amounts of alcohol. Each successive interpretation is narrower than the previous one, with a more restricted denotation.
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(1b) suggests a pragmatic motive for narrowing. On a literal interpretation, the speaker would be understood as making the blatantly false claim that buying a house is easy for someone with any money at all; the effect of narrowing is to yield a more plausible, (Searle 1980) . A similar point is made in an experimental study of adjectives by the psychologist Gregory Murphy (1997) . Taking as an example the adjective 'fresh', and using a variety of experimental techniques, he showed that it has innumerable slightly different interpretations across contexts. One method was to ask participants to provide antonyms for its occurrence in different adjective-noun combinations. Some of the most frequent responses are listed in (3) (Murphy 1997: 237-39 Lexical broadening involves the use of a word to convey a more general sense than the encoded one, with a consequent expansion of the linguistically-specified denotation. As noted above, radical versions of the unified approach to lexical pragmatics such as the one proposed in relevance theory treat approximation, hyperbole and metaphor as subvarieties of broadening which differ mainly in the degree to which the linguistically-specified denotation is expanded. Approximation is the case where a word with a relatively strict sense is marginally extended to include a penumbra of items (what Lasersohn (1999) calls a 9 'pragmatic halo') that strictly speaking fall outside its linguistically-specified denotation.
Some illustrations are given in (4):
4a. That bottle is empty.
4b. This policy will bankrupt the farmers.
4c. The garden is south-facing.
In (4a), the word 'empty', which has a relatively strict sense, might be intended and understood as an approximation, so that the speaker would be interpreted as claiming that the bottle in question is EMPTY*: that is, close enough to being EMPTY for the differences to be inconsequential for the purpose at hand (for instance, collecting bottles for recycling). In (4b), the word 'bankrupt' may be intended and understood either literally (BANKRUPT) or as an approximation (BANKRUPT*), in which case the speaker would be interpreted as claiming that the policy will bring the farmers close enough to bankruptcy for the differences to be inconsequential. Similarly, in (4c), the term 'south-facing' may be used literally (to mean that the garden faces due south), or as an approximation (SOUTH-FACING*), meaning that the garden faces in a generally southerly direction.
On more radical versions of the unified approach, hyperbole is seen as involving a further degree of broadening, and hence a greater departure from the encoded meaning. For instance, a parent might say (4a) hyperbolically while pointing to a three-quarters-empty bottle, intending to convey that a teenager has drunk too much. Similarly, an opposition member might use (4b) to indicate hyperbolically that as a result of the government's policy, the farmers will be substantially poorer than might have been expected or desired; and a new house owner might say (4c) hyperbolically of a house described in the estate agent's brochure as facing east-south-east, intending to implicate that she has made the right choice. The fact that in each of these examples ('empty', 'bankrupt', 'south-facing') there seems to be a gradient or continuum of cases between literal use, approximation and hyperbole makes it worth looking for a unified account in which the same interpretive mechanisms apply throughout.
Within the fully unified account we are proposing, metaphor is seen as a still more radical variety of broadening than hyperbole, involving a greater departure from the encoded meaning. Consider (5a)- (5c In (6a), for instance, the speaker may be understood as conveying that she actually vomited (a literal interpretation), that she came close enough to vomiting for the differences not to matter (an approximate interpretation), that the film made her physically queasy (a hyperbolic interpretation), or that the film induced some mental discomfort (etc.) (a metaphorical interpretation). Similar points apply to (6b) and (6c). In section 4, we will suggest how such cases might be handled on a unified inferential account.
A further variety of broadening, which we will call category extension, is typified by the use of salient brand names ('Hoover', 'Xerox', 'Sellotape') to denote a broader category (vacuum cleaners, photocopiers, sticky tape) including items from less salient brands.
Personal names ('Chomsky', 'Shakespeare') and common nouns both lend themselves to category extension (cf. Vietnam for it to be acceptable to call it 'Vietnam', but merely that it belongs to a broader category of which Vietnam is a salient member; and so on for the other examples. What approximation and category extension have in common is that they are both analysable as outcomes of a single pragmatic process of lexical adjustment which results in an ad hoc category whose denotation is broader than that of the lexically encoded concept.
Neologisms and word coinages provide further data for a theory of lexical pragmatics and shed some light on the nature of the mental mechanisms involved. Experiments by Clark & Clark (1979) and Clark & Gerrig (1983) show that newly-coined verbs derived from nouns, as in (8a)- (8b), and the recruitment of proper names into compound verbs or adjectives, as in (8c)-(8d), are no harder to understand than regular uses:
8a. The boy porched the newspaper.
8b. She wristed the ball over the net.
8c.
He did a Napoleon for the camera.
8d.
They have a lifestyle which is very San Francisco.
Understanding (8a) and (8b) A further range of examples that a theory of lexical pragmatics might help to explain are pun-like cases involving an element of equivocation or word play. Consider (9): 9. Not all banks are river banks.
Most English hearers intuitively understand this as both true and informative: that is, they intuitively interpret 'bank' as picking out both the set of river banks and the set of financial institutions. The question is how the interpretation is best explained. One possibility is to go metalinguistic and treat 'bank' here as representing the set of things that are called 'banks'.
An alternative possibility suggested by the ad hoc concept approach is to treat the interpretation as involving the online construction of an ad hoc concept BANK* whose denotation includes both the set of river banks and the set of financial institutions. This approach might shed some light on the common use of pun-like comparisons such as those in (10), in which adjectives such as 'cold' and 'hard' have to be simultaneously understood in both physical and psychological senses:
people or a group, and so become regularly and frequently used. In such cases, the pragmatic process of concept construction becomes progressively more routinised, and may ultimately spread through a speech community and stabilise as an extra lexical sense. We would therefore expect a unified account of lexical pragmatic processes to shed light on the nature of polysemy (the fact that many words have a range of distinct, though related, senses) and on processes of lexical change more generally.
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In fact, it is often pointed out that pragmatic processes of broadening, narrowing and metaphorical extension play a major role in semantic change (Lyons, 1977; Traugott and Dasher 2001) . If our unified account is correct, the resulting senses should all be seen as outcomes of the frequent and widespread application to a particular lexical item of a single pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction.
Approaches to lexical adjustment
Many pragmatic or philosophical accounts seem to take for granted that narrowing, approximation and metaphorical extension are distinct pragmatic processes, which lack common descriptions or explanations and need not be studied together. For instance, narrowing is often analysed as a case of default inference to a stereotypical interpretation, 11 approximation has been seen as linked to variations in the standards of precision governing 10 Of course, a full explanation of lexical semantic change would require, in addition to the account of lexical pragmatic processes, an account of how and why certain representations spread (catch on) in a community or culture while others do not. For a naturalistic approach to the 'epidemiology' of representations (including semantic representations), which takes account of a variety of contributing mental and environmental phenomena, see Sperber (1996) .
11 See e.g. Levinson (2000) , Blutner (1998 Blutner ( , 2004 . For discussion, see Horn (1984, this volume) , Lakoff (1987 (4a)- (4c) and (6a)- (6c) were designed to show, in many cases, no clear cut-off point exists. We have argued in some detail elsewhere that there are also internal descriptive and theoretical reasons for wanting to go beyond these existing accounts and develop a more unified approach (see Carston 1997 Carston , 2002 Wilson 2003 ). We will not repeat those points here, but assume that the conclusion they point to is correct: that is, that narrowing and broadening (including metaphorical cases)
are complementary processes, one restricting and the other extending the category denoted by the linguistically-encoded concept, so that a unitary account is well worth pursuing.
In the next section, we will outline the relevance-theoretic view that lexical comprehension involves a process of ad hoc concept construction, based on information readily accessible from the encyclopaedic entries of the encoded concepts and constrained by expectations of relevance.
14 In the rest of this section, we want to establish two preliminary 12 See e.g. Lewis (1979) , Lasersohn (1999) . For discussion, see Gross (2001) .
points: first, that lexical pragmatic processes such as narrowing and broadening contribute to truth-conditional content (what is asserted or explicated) rather than merely affecting implicatures, as on standard Gricean accounts; second, that current approaches which agree on this point differ significantly on the nature of the cognitive mechanisms involved, and specifically, on the extent to which they are properly inferential.
First, some arguments supporting the truth-conditional view. Perhaps the clearest evidence comes from neologisms such as those exemplified in (8a)-(8d). Verbs such as 'porch', 'wrist' and 'teapot' were coined for experimental purposes and have no encoded meanings in English: thus, if the ad hoc concepts PORCH*, WRIST* and TEAPOT* do not contribute to the proposition expressed or asserted by these utterances, there is no proposition expressed or asserted at all. This runs counter to the clear and widespread intuition that these utterances can be used to make assertions in the regular way, and would make it very difficult to provide an adequate account of how particular implicatures are warranted in these cases.
More generally, any analysis of how utterances are used in communication must take account of potential differences in the acquisition and organisation of lexical meanings among members of a speech community. A word that is familiar to the speaker of an utterance and has a regular encoded meaning in English may nonetheless be unfamiliar to the hearer, who will be forced to interpret it inferentially along similar lines to neologisms. Conversely, a word that is unfamiliar to the speaker and produced as a neologism may be one the hearer has encountered before and assigned a regular encoded meaning. Given such differences, the idea that only encoded concepts can contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances appears rather arbitrary and unworkable.
There is also evidence that it is the pragmatically adjusted meaning of a word or phrase, rather than the linguistically encoded meaning, that falls within the scope of sentence 18 operators such as negation, conditionals, disjunction, 'because', imperative and interrogative moods, etc. Consider the examples in (11): 11a. No teenager is a saint.
11b. If the bottle is empty, leave it out for recycling.
11c. Be an angel and pick up the shopping for me on the way home.
11d. Either you become a human being or you leave the group.
In (11a), if the encoded meaning of 'saint' is interpreted as falling within the scope of negation, the speaker will be understood as making the trivial claim that no teenager has been canonised. In fact, the speaker of (11a) would generally be understood as making the more plausible, informative or relevant claim that no teenager falls in the category of SAINTS* (that is, roughly, people of outstanding virtue). But in that case, it is the adjusted meaning rather than the encoded meaning that falls within the scope of negation and contributes to the proposition expressed. Similar points apply to the other examples. In the case of (11d), for instance, given that the addressee is a human being already, it would be impossible for him to comply with the first disjunct, literally understood (and therefore pointless for the speaker to ask him to comply with it). Clearly, what the hearer is being encouraged to do as an alternative to leaving the group is to start behaving in a more reasonable or sensitive way (that is, to become a HUMAN BEING*). But in that case, it is the adjusted meaning rather than the encoded meaning that falls within the scope of the disjunction operator and contributes to the proposition expressed. (For discussion and illustration of these 'embedding tests' applied to cases of lexical adjustment, see Levinson 2000 , Recanati 1995 , Carston 2002 'saint' and 'angel' are genuine cases of polysemy, and the comprehension of (11a) and (11c) does not involve ad hoc concept construction but is a simple matter of disambiguation (choosing which of two or more encoded senses should figure in the proposition expressed).
For others who have encountered these metaphors less frequently or not at all, 'saint' and 'angel' may have only a single encoded sense (SAINT, ANGEL) and the interpretation of (11a) and (11c) would involve constructing (or re-constructing) an appropriate ad hoc concept. In the first case, where 'saint' and 'angel' are genuinely polysemous and interpreted via disambiguation, there is no doubt that the encoded senses SAINT* and ANGEL* would contribute to the truth-conditional content of (11a) and (11c), and hence to what is asserted or explicated. But it is implausible to suppose that (11a) and (11c) would be understood as expressing or asserting entirely different propositions depending on whether the concepts SAINT* and ANGEL* are recovered by disambiguation or ad hoc concept construction. One of the most important functions of pragmatic inference is to compensate for grammatical and lexical differences among members of a speech community, so that addressees with different encoded senses can end up with the same interpretations, albeit via different routes. 
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all the available evidence points to the conclusion that ad hoc concepts contribute to the truthconditional content of utterances, rather than merely to implicatures.
As noted above (section 1), current truth-conditional accounts of lexical pragmatics differ significantly as to the cognitive mechanisms involved in the lexical adjustment process.
At one extreme are fully inferential accounts, which treat utterance interpretation in general, and lexical adjustment in particular, as properly inferential processes, taking a set of premises as input and yielding as output a set of conclusions logically derivable from, or at least warranted by, the premises. According to relevance theory, for instance, the interpretation of (5a) above ('Sally is a chameleon') would involve an overall non-demonstrative inference process which takes as input a premise such as (12a) (together with other contextual assumptions) and yields as output a conclusion such as (12b): 12a. The speaker has said 'Sally is a chameleon' (i.e. a sentence with a fragmentary decoded meaning requiring inferential completion and complementation)
12b. The speaker meant that Sally x is a CHAMELEON*, Sally x is changeable, Sally x has a capacity to adapt to her surroundings, it's hard to discern Sally x 's true nature (etc.)
Since utterance interpretation takes place at a risk, the truth of the premise in (12a) cannot guarantee the truth of the conclusion in (12b), but, according to relevance theory, hearers have an automatic inferential heuristic for constructing the best interpretation given the evidence available to them. This interpretation itself has an internal logical structure: its construction involves the application of deductive inference processes which take as input premises such as 'Sally is a CHAMELEON* (together with further contextual premises) and yield as output conclusions such as 'Sally is changeable,' 'Sally has a capacity to adapt to her surroundings' (etc.) which follow logically from the set of premises chosen. Thus, the account is doubly inferential: on the one hand, the implicatures of an utterance must be deducible from its explicatures (together with appropriate contextual assumptions); on the other, the fact that the speaker has uttered this sentence on this particular occasion must (together with appropriate contextual assumptions) warrant the conclusion that she meant to convey this particular set of explicatures and implicatures. We will develop these ideas in more detail in section 4 (for further discussion, see Carston 1997 Carston , 2002 Carston , 2006 Sperber & Wilson 1998, forthcoming; Wilson & Carston 2006; .
At the other extreme from this account are predominantly associationist accounts which treat lexical adjustment in largely non-inferential terms. Examples include the computational account of predicate interpretation proposed by Kintsch (2000 Kintsch ( , 2001 , connectionist accounts, and many treatments of metaphor within the cognitive linguistics framework (Lakoff 1987 (Lakoff , 1994 Fauconnier and Turner 2002) . Kintsch uses a spreading activation model based on statistical associations among lexical items in a corpus to account for differences between the literal and metaphorical interpretations of the predicate 'is a shark'. According to his data, close associates of the word 'shark' include the words 'fins', 'dolphin', 'diver', and 'fish', and these associations provide the basis for his account. These are classic cases of non-inferential association, in which the associates of 'shark' are not logically related to it in any systematic way (for instance, 'x is a shark' entails 'x is a fish', but does not entail 'x is a dolphin', 'x is a diver') and the associations provide no basis for drawing warranted conclusions. Kintsch sees this as a potential weakness in his model:
'For instance, [the model] fails to explain the relations among shark and its neighbours -that is, how we understand that a shark has fins, looks like a dolphin, is a danger to divers, and is a fish.' (Kintsch 2000: 259; our highlighting) 22 By contrast, many cognitive linguistic models of lexical interpretation treat 'domain mapping' (i.e. the setting up of systematic correspondences between items from distinct cognitive domains) as the key to metaphor interpretation. On this approach, the interpretation of (5a) above ('Sally is a chameleon') might involve a mapping between the domain of animals and the domain of people. Here again the associations are of a non-inferential kind.
Between these two extremes lie mixed associative/inferential approaches: for instance, Recanati (1995 Recanati ( , 2004 distinguishes 'primary', strictly associative, pragmatic processes from 'secondary', properly inferential, pragmatic processes, with the move from decoded meaning to explicature (e.g. from CHAMELEON to CHAMELEON*) being treated as a primary, hence non-inferential, process and the move from explicatures to implicatures (e.g.
from the premise that the speaker said that Sally x is a CHAMELEON* to the conclusion that she meant that Sally x changes to fit her surroundings (etc.)) as secondary and properly inferential. There is a general theoretical point to make about the relation between these approaches. From a cognitive point of view, all inferential relationships are also associations: an inferential mechanism establishes systematic correspondences between (constituents of) premises and (constituents of) conclusions. Thus, for many English speakers, the concept ANGEL is inferentially associated with the concept VERY GOOD AND KIND, the concept CHAMELEON is inferentially associated with the concept CHANGES TO FIT ITS SURROUNDINGS, and so on. However, as illustrated above, not all associations are inferential. In the minds of many speakers of English, for instance, 'shark' is noninferentially associated with 'diver', 'salt' with 'pepper', 'love' with 'hate', and so on. In a purely associationist account, the fact that some associates happen to be inferentially related provides no basis for deriving warranted conclusions unless some additional machinery is 23 introduced to set up appropriate inferential links. In a properly inferential account, the only associations that play a role in lexical adjustment are inferential ones. Thus, the claim that lexical adjustment is a properly inferential process is considerably more constrained than the claim that it is a general associative process, and an adequate properly inferential account would therefore be preferable on theoretical grounds. In the next section, we propose a fully inferential relevance-theoretic account of the fast, on-line pragmatic process of lexical adjustment. At the end of the chapter, we return to the issue of inferential versus associative processes and consider some possible objections to a unified inferential account.
An inferential account of lexical adjustment
An adequate account of lexical narrowing and broadening must answer four questions:
I.
What triggers the lexical adjustment process (why not simply accept the encoded sense)?
II.
What determines the direction that the adjustment process takes?
III.
How does the adjustment process work in detail?
IV.
What brings it to an end?
Relevance theory treats lexical narrowing and broadening, like utterance interpretation in general, as guided by expectations of relevance. Relevance is defined as a property of utterances and other inputs to cognitive processes (e.g. external stimuli such as sights and sounds, and internal representations such as thoughts, memories or conclusions of inferences). An input is relevant to an individual when it connects with available contextual assumptions to yield positive cognitive effects (e.g. true contextual implications, warranted strengthenings or revisions of existing assumptions). For present purposes, the most important type of cognitive effect is a contextual implication: an implication deducible from input and context together, but from neither input nor context alone. Other things being equal, the greater the cognitive effects, and the smaller the mental effort required to derive them (by representing the input, accessing a context and deriving any contextual implications), the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. According to this heuristic, at each point in the on-line processing of an utterance, the addressee tentatively chooses the most accessible interpretation, and reconsiders this choice only if it seems unlikely (on the basis of the available evidence) to lead to an overall interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance. The same procedure applies to the full range of pragmatic tasks: assigning referents to referential expressions, disambiguating ambiguous words or structures, supplying contextual assumptions, deriving implications, etc.
Thus, the fact that an interpretation is highly accessible gives it an initial degree of plausibility. A hearer using this heuristic will stop at the first overall interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance: this is his best hypothesis about the speaker's meaning given the evidence available to him.
This procedure applies equally to the adjustment of lexical meaning, which (following the arguments of the last section) we will treat as contributing both to the proposition expressed by an utterance and to its contextual implications or implicatures (i.e. intended contextual implications). Consider how the verb 'rest' might be understood in the following exchange:
13. Bill: I'm doing the 10km circuit run this afternoon. Wanna come with me?
Sue: No thanks, I'm resting today.
The verb 'rest' has a rather general meaning, which covers any degree of inactivity (physical or mental), from sleeping to staying awake but not moving much to performing a range of not very strenuous tasks (with many more possibilities in between). Suppose now that Sue is quite an athletic person, who exercises regularly: then her use of 'rest' here is plausibly understood as expressing the ad hoc concept REST*, which indicates a much lower degree of physical activity than she undertakes on her training days but is still quite compatible with her pottering about the garden or walking to the shops. A hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic would narrow the encoded concept REST just so far as is required to satisfy his expectation of relevance (e.g. by explaining why Sue is refusing his invitation), and no further. This particular narrowing would cost Bill little effort, given his knowledge of Sue's exercise habits, and provide him with a range of contextual implications (e.g. she won't come with me today because she is RESTING*, she may come another day when she isn't RESTING*, etc.). In different circumstances -for instance, in response to the question 'Would you like to walk to the corner shop with me?' -REST would have to be narrowed much further.
Given the commitment of relevance theory to a unitary account of lexical pragmatic processes, the same kind of analysis should carry over to cases of concept broadening (including metaphorical uses). Let's look at an example, going into a little more detail about how the adjustment process works. Consider the following exchange, focusing on Mary's use of the word 'angel': 17 17 As noted above, for quite a few people, 'angel' may have acquired a further encoded sense (ANGEL*), and so be a case of polysemy. This is not a problem, since our approach can be taken in three ways: (a) as providing an account of the on-line process of concept construction for anyone for whom this is not a conventionalised usage; The decoded meaning of the sentence Mary uttered contains the concept ANGEL, which activates a range of logical properties (e.g. an angel is a SUPERNATURAL BEING OF A CERTAIN KIND), enabling deductive inferences to be drawn (e.g. from the proposition that Sally is an ANGEL, it is deducible that Sally is a SUPERNATURAL BEING OF A CERTAIN KIND). The decoded concept ANGEL also activates a variety of more or less strongly evidenced encyclopaedic properties of different subsets of angels (good angels, guardian angels, avenging angels, dark angels, fallen angels, and so on) enabling further conclusions to be drawn (e.g. the proposition that Sally is a (good) angel, if processed in a context containing the assumption that (good) angels are exceptionally kind, contextually implies that Sally is exceptionally kind). Some plausible encyclopaedic properties of (good) angels are given in (15):
15.
Encyclopaedic properties of (GOOD) ANGEL:
EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD AND KIND
WATCHES OVER HUMANS AND HELPS THEM WHEN NEEDED VIRTUOUS IN THOUGHT AND DEED
MESSENGER OF GOD, etc.
Since the stereotypical angel is a good angel, and the encyclopaedic properties of stereotypical category members are likely to be highly accessible as a result of frequent use, properties such as those in (15) are likely to be strongly activated by use of the word 'angel'.
In the discourse context in (14), where Peter is expecting an answer about Sally's readiness to look after children, encyclopaedic properties having to do with kindness, helpfulness and watchfulness are likely to receive additional activation from other items in the context, and would therefore be most accessible for use in deriving contextual implications. Using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, Peter therefore tentatively assumes that among the implicatures of Mary's utterance are contextual implications such as those in (16) Of course, Sally is not a supernatural being, and therefore not an ANGEL, so the contextual implications in (16) are not yet properly warranted. However, by narrowing the denotation of ANGEL to include only (good) angels and broadening it to include people who share with (good) angels some of the encyclopaedic properties in (15), Peter can interpret Mary as asserting that Sally x is an ANGEL* and implicating that she is helpful, kind, watchful (etc.), and will look after the children if Peter and Mary are ill. Having found an interpretation which satisfies his expectations of relevance, at this point he should stop.
According to this account, lexical adjustment is a special case of a more general process of mutual parallel adjustment in which tentative hypotheses about contextual assumptions, explicatures and contextual implications are incrementally modified so as to yield an overall interpretation which satisfies the hearer's expectations of relevance.
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In (14), the decoded concept ANGEL suggests a range of potential implications which would satisfy 18 The process is parallel rather than sequential, with hypotheses being constructed and adjusted by following a path of least effort, which may differ across individuals and discourse contexts. See Wilson and Sperber (2002, 2004) .
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Peter's expectations of relevance provided that they were properly warranted. Using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, he tentatively accepts these implications and looks for an interpretation of 'angel' which would justify their derivation. In the discourse context in (14), the most accessible adjustment of the encoded concept ANGEL (and hence the one favoured by the heuristic) is the ad hoc concept ANGEL*, which is narrower than ANGEL in some respects, and broader in others. On this account, the implications in (16) are derived by regular forward inference from the premise that Sally is a (GOOD) ANGEL (together with additional contextual assumptions), and they in turn provide the basis for a 'backward'
inference to the adjusted propositions (Sally x is an ANGEL*, ANGELS* are exceptionally kind (etc.)) which justify their acceptance as part of an overall interpretation that satisfies the hearer's expectations of relevance.
19
Both narrowing and broadening emerge as by-products of the search for relevance, and the same encoded concept may be narrowed or broadened (or both) to different degrees and in different ways across different occasions of use.
We suggested above (section 2) that 'approximation', 'hyperbole', 'metaphor' are not distinct theoretical kinds, requiring different interpretive mechanisms, but merely occupy different points on a continuum of degrees of broadening. To illustrate this point in more detail, consider (17): 17. The water is boiling.
This utterance might be intended and understood literally, or as an approximation, a hyperbole or a metaphor, with no clear cut-off points between these various possibilities. On the relevance-theoretic account outlined above, all these interpretations are arrived at in the 19 On the role of 'backward' inference in the mutual adjustment process, see Sperber and Wilson (1998), same way, by adding to the context encyclopaedic information made accessible by the encoded concept BOILING (and by other concepts activated by the utterance or the discourse) and deriving enough implications to satisfy the hearer's expectations of relevance. What makes the resulting interpretation intuitively 'literal', 'approximate', 'hyperbolical' or 'metaphorical' is simply the particular set of encyclopaedic assumptions actually deployed in making the utterance relevant in the expected way.
Let's suppose that the encyclopaedic properties simultaneously activated by both 'water' and 'boiling' (and therefore potentially highly accessible for the interpretation of (17)) include those in (18a)- (18d) To save space, we present these simply as properties rather than as complete propositions. However, since the function of encyclopaedic information is to provide premises for the derivation of contextual implications, each property should be seen as a constituent of a complete proposition. 21 Here, the 'etc.' is intended to cover encyclopaedic properties of strictly BOILING water that do not hold for broader interpretations; in (18c), it covers encyclopaedic properties that hold both for strictly BOILING water and for water that is almost BOILING (i.e. BOILING*), but not for water that is BOILING** or BOILING***; and so on for (18b) and (18a). We are not claiming, of course, that encyclopaedic information is neatly organised in this way:
merely that the choice of a particular set of assumptions in the course of the mutual adjustment process will determine whether the utterance is intuitively 'literal', 'approximate', 'metaphorical', and so on.
Then (17) would be intuitively 'metaphorical' if the implications that make the utterance relevant in the expected way depend on (18a), but not on (18b)-(18d) (so that the speaker is not understood as committed to the claim that the water is hot); it would be intuitively a 'hyperbole' if these implications depend on (18b), but not on (18c)-(18d); it would be an 'approximation' if these implications depend on (18c), but not on (18d), and it would be 'literal' if the deployment of (18d) is crucial to making the utterance relevant in the expected way (so that the denotation of the concept expressed includes only items that are actually BOILING). In each case, the comprehension process works in the same way, by selection of an appropriate set of encyclopaedic assumptions to act as premises for the derivation of the expected contextual implications. The appropriateness of different sets of encyclopaedic assumptions depends, on the one hand, on their degree of accessibility in the particular discourse context, and, on the other, on the potential contextual implications they yield. As always, the hearer's goal is to derive enough implications, at a low enough cost, to satisfy the particular expectations of relevance raised by the utterance in that discourse context.
In this section, we have proposed a fully inferential account of lexical narrowing and broadening which answers the four basic questions of lexical pragmatics as follows:
I. Narrowing and broadening are triggered by the search for relevance.
II. They follow a path of least effort in whatever direction it leads.
III. They come about through mutual adjustment of explicatures, contextual assumptions and implications (or implicatures) so as to satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance.
IV. They stop when these expectations are satisfied.
As suggested above (section 3), this account treats utterance comprehension as doubly inferential: it consists of an overall non-demonstrative inference process in which the deductive inference processes required to derive the contextual implications that satisfy the hearer's expectations of relevance play an essential role. Overall, comprehension starts from the premise that the speaker has uttered a sentence S (e.g. 'Sally is an angel') with a certain encoded meaning, and arrives at the warranted conclusion that the speaker meant that P 1 …P n (e.g. that Sally x is an ANGEL*, that she is good, kind, watchful and will help look after the children). This overall non-demonstrative process is carried out by the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, a domain-specific form of inference justified only for overt communication . In order to arrive at a warranted conclusion about the speaker's meaning, the hearer must perform a range of deductive inferences (e.g. from ANGEL/ANGEL* to VERY GOOD AND KIND, WATCHFUL, HELPFUL (etc.)) in order to derive enough contextual implications to satisfy his expectations of relevance. According to relevance theory, these two types of inference are intimately connected. It is only by deriving (deductive) contextual implications, as in (16) above, that the hearer can justify a particular hypothesis about the speaker's meaning as the best explanation of the fact that she uttered sentence S. By contrast, purely associative accounts of lexical adjustment involve neither type of inference, while mixed associative/inferential approaches such as Recanati's (1995 Recanati's ( , 2004 ) involve a combination of deductive inference and inference to the best explanation which takes as input the associatively constructed explicit content (or the fact that the speaker has expressed it) 22 and arrives at a warranted conclusion about the intended implicit content.
As noted in section 3, an adequate properly inferential account is more constrained than purely associative and mixed inferential-associative accounts, and is therefore preferable on 22 For further discussion of Recanati's (2004: 32) view that for explicature 'the dynamics of accessibility does everything and no "inference" is required', see Carston (2006) and the response in Recanati (2006) . 33 theoretical grounds. We believe the account of lexical adjustment we have proposed in this section is descriptively adequate. In the next section, we will consider some further data which might be seen as raising problems for this account.
Questions and implications
In this final section, we will briefly consider some broader questions about inferential accounts of lexical adjustment. While some (in our view) can be straightforwardly answered, others raise genuine issues for future research.
An objection sometimes raised to inferential accounts of metaphor interpretation is that they cannot handle the so-called emergent property issue. To illustrate, consider the utterance in (19): 19. That surgeon should be dismissed. He is a butcher.
The speaker of (19) is plausibly understood as conveying that the surgeon in question is extremely incompetent, dangerous, not to be trusted with the lives of patients, and so on.
These properties are not standardly associated with either SURGEON or BUTCHER in isolation, but 'emerge' in the course of the interpretation. Emergent properties raise a problem for all accounts of metaphor interpretation. The challenge for inferential accounts is to show how they can be inferentially derived (see Carston 2002, chapter 5 , for a fuller discussion of the dimensions of the problem).
On the relevance-theoretic approach outlined in section 4, the interpretation of (19) would involve adding to the context encyclopaedic information made accessible by the encoded concept BUTCHER (or by other concepts activated by the utterance or the discourse) and deriving the contextual implications that the surgeon is incompetent, dangerous, not to be trusted with the lives of patients (etc.). But, as Vega Moreno (2004: 298) points out, 'The properties that the hearer takes the speaker to be attributing to the surgeon are not stored as part of his representation of "butcher", so must be derived by some other means than simply searching through his knowledge about butchers.'
In recent relevance theoretic accounts, it has been argued that emergent properties are analysable as genuine contextual implications which emerge in the course of the mutual adjustment process based on contextual premises derived from several sources.
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In (19), for instance, the speaker may be understood as asserting that the surgeon in question is a BUTCHER*, where BUTCHER* is a regular adjusted concept based on encyclopaedic information associated with the encoded concept BUTCHER, denoting people who share with butchers the encyclopaedic property of cutting flesh in a certain way (using the same techniques as butchers, with the same intentions, concern for welfare, degree of skill, and so on). From the proposition that the surgeon is a BUTCHER*, together with encyclopaedic information associated with the encoded concept SURGEON, it follows straightforwardly that the surgeon in question is grossly incompetent, dangerous, not to be trusted with the lives of patients, and deserves to be dismissed. Contextual implications of this type are highly accessible in the discourse context in (19), and would help to satisfy the hearer's expectations of relevance; they are therefore likely to be accepted as implicatures by a hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic. This account is genuinely inferential, and the 35 'emergent properties' are straightforwardly analysable as both contextual implications and implicatures.
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There are more general questions about the relation between fully inferential accounts and purely or partly associative accounts, which deserve greater consideration than we have space for here. We will just mention two of them. First, how far is our inferential account of narrowing and broadening theoretically and empirically distinguishable from purely or partly associative accounts? This question (in our view) has a straightforward answer. Throughout this paper, we have argued that the relevance-theoretic account of lexical narrowing and broadening is much more constrained than associative accounts, and if empirically adequate, would be theoretically preferable for that reason. If the only associations exploited in lexical adjustment are inferential ones which narrow or broaden the denotation of the encoded concept, purely or partly associative accounts will vastly overgenerate, and some method for filtering out unwanted associations will be required. A typical method of filtering is to distinguish a designated set of permissible mapping relations (e.g. metaphorical mapping is seen as based on resemblance relations between source and target domains, metonymic mapping as based on contiguity relations, synecdoche on part-whole relations, etc.), with an additional pragmatic constraint that the output of the mapping must be 'noteworthy', 'salient', or 'fit the context' in some way (cf. Nunberg 1995 , Recanati 2004 In fact, many of the associations/mappings repeatedly mentioned in the cognitive linguistics literature (e.g. between properties of particular animals and human psychological traits, or between machines and humans; cf. Lakoff 1987 , 1994 , Gibbs & Tendahl 2006 In each of these utterances, the speaker is plausibly understood as referring to someone or something that is not explicitly mentioned, but that stands in some designated relation to the item which is denoted by the italicised expression. Examples of this type are standardly analysed as involving domain mappings or correspondences between source and target domains (e.g. between musical instruments and their players, locations and the people who work there, those who give orders and those who carry them out). While relevance theorists have devoted a lot of attention to reanalysing metaphorical 'mappings' in inferential terms, they have so far been much less concerned with 'metonymic mappings' such as those in (20), 27 and it is a genuine question how far such examples can be reanalysed in purely inferential terms. We will not attempt a reanalysis here, but simply make a few brief observations suggesting lines on which this issue might be approached.
Notice, first, that the notion of metonymy is harder to grasp intuitively than the notion of metaphor. While theorists and ordinary speakers of a language tend to agree on which utterances are metaphorical, there is much less agreement on which are cases of metonymy.
In the cognitive linguistics literature, for instance, all the examples in (20) are standardly described as involving a metonymic use of the italicised noun phrases. However, anaphorabased tests proposed by Nunberg (1995 Nunberg ( , 2004 suggest that in (20c) and (20d) it is not the italicised noun-phrases but the predicates 'serve dinner' and 'bombed Hanoi' that are used in an extended sense. If so, these examples should be straightforwardly reanalysable in inferential terms, as cases of lexical broadening based on ad hoc concept construction. What remains then is a small residue of cases, including (20a) and (20b), which seem to involve genuine reference substitution and which are not straightforwardly reducible to lexical narrowing or broadening. We hope to return in future work to the question of whether these cases can be handled in inferential terms.
